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Abstract 
Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) suggests that individuals compare themselves 
to others in order to determine their standing in various life domains (e.g., wealth, intelligence, 
popularity). These social comparisons are especially common in the physical appearance 
domain, in which women frequently compare their appearance to that of other women, even 
when it becomes detrimental to their body image (Strahan et al., 2006). Applying Gilbert’s 
(2000) social mentalities theory, which posits that individuals can adopt various mindsets in their 
interactions with others, this study used a novel intervention to investigate whether cultivating a 
caregiving mentality would alleviate the negative consequences of appearance-focused social 
comparisons. For 48 hours, 57 female undergraduates practiced one of three strategies when they 
made unfavourable appearance comparisons: cultivating feelings of compassion and loving-
kindness toward the comparison target (Caregiving); comparing themselves favourably to the 
target in other domains (Competition); or distracting themselves (Control). The Caregiving 
condition tended to increase feelings of social safeness more than the other conditions. 
Furthermore, among women with higher baseline eating pathology, the Caregiving condition was 
more effective than the Competition condition at reducing body dissatisfaction and eating-
disorder related comparison orientation. Similarly, among women with lower trait compassion, 
the Caregiving condition was more effective than the Competition condition at increasing 
feelings of social safeness and reducing eating disorder-related comparison orientation. Findings 
suggest that cultivating a compassion-oriented, caregiving mentality when threatened by 
appearance-focused social comparisons could help young women, especially those most 
vulnerable, to reduce the negative consequences tied to these comparisons and to improve 
feelings of social connectedness.  
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Literature Review and General Introduction 
The Competitive Society: An Introduction to Social Comparison Theory 
 Researchers have argued that humans are evolutionarily hard-wired to compete with each 
other (Alexander, 1990). Throughout time, we have competed for the fundamental resources 
required for survival, such as food, water, and territory; and in contemporary society, we 
compete in many more fields, such as sports, business, and politics. Competition is found at all 
levels of society—between nations, between rival groups or classes within a nation, and perhaps 
most ubiquitously, between individuals.  
Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) posits that in order to determine one’s 
standing in life’s various domains, individuals will compare themselves against others. Social 
comparison theory distinguishes between two types of comparisons. In upward comparisons, 
individuals compare themselves to others whom they perceive to be superior in a given domain. 
For example, one might compare themselves to a neighbour in terms of wealth, and conclude 
based on house size and car makes that they were decidedly less wealthy than this neighbour; 
this would be an upward comparison. In downward comparisons, people compare themselves to 
others whom they perceive to be inferior in a given domain. For example, one might compare 
themselves to a friend on the basis of intelligence, and conclude based on academic performance 
that they were smarter than this friend; this would be a downward comparison. Consistent with 
Festinger’s (1954) theorizing, the former type of comparison produces adverse consequences in 
the form of negative affect and decreased self-esteem (Morse & Gergen, 1970; Salovey & Rodin, 
1984), while the latter type produces positive affect and boosts self-esteem (Gibbons, 1986; 
Hakmiller, 1966; Lemyre & Smith, 1985, Morse & Gergen, 1970). 
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The need to compare influences one’s feelings of satisfaction with oneself in a variety of 
domains, such as wealth, intelligence, competence, popularity, and physical appearance 
(Emmons & Diener, 1985). For example, Van Yperen and Leander (2014) found that in one’s 
self-evaluation of performance, social comparison information (i.e., information about one’s 
performance relative to others) consistently overpowers temporal comparison information (i.e., 
information about one’s current performance relative to one’s previous performance) even if 
one’s stated goal is mastery-based (e.g., to do better on a task than one had done before). In 
another study, increased income was found to increase life satisfaction only when income grew 
compared to peers of similar age, education level, or geographic region (Boyce, Brown, & 
Moore, 2010). One’s happiness with oneself and one’s circumstances is influenced considerably 
by whether one is keeping up with, or preferably, ahead of, one’s peers. 
This need to compare oneself to others can be adaptive. Under conditions of threat, 
downward comparisons are commonly employed in the pursuit of self-enhancement (Wills, 
1981). For example, after doing poorly on an exam, one might compare themselves to classmates 
who have done even worse on that exam to enhance their sense of competence. When one 
experiences distressing life events, downward comparisons can serve as an important coping 
strategy: for example, Wood, Taylor, and Lichtman (1985) found that among a sample of women 
with breast cancer, downward comparisons made with other breast cancer patients on the basis of 
adjustment, physical status, and life circumstances (e.g., marital satisfaction, age) were 
overwhelmingly prevalent relative to upward comparisons or comparisons to similar others. 
Even upward comparisons can provide useful information in the pursuit of self-evaluation and 
self-motivation, and can be a source of hope and inspiration (Buunk, Collins, Taylor, Van 
Yperen, & Dakof, 1990; Collins, 1996; Helgeson & Taylor, 1993). For example, in working 
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towards a certain goal, individuals often put up images of others who have already achieved 
those goals, and compare their relative progress: aspiring athletes may put up posters of 
successful athletes that they admire and make regular upward comparisons to them in order to 
motivate themselves. Indeed, the practice of making comparisons, whether upward or downward, 
can serve various helpful functions. 
However, while the competitive orientation that often underlies the practice of making 
social comparisons is a vital evolutionary force, for many it may come at a cost. The theorized 
increase of competitive behaviour in society has been proposed as an explanation (Gilbert, 1989) 
for the rising rates of psychopathology among Western societies (Murray & Lopez, 1996). 
Indeed, research has found higher rates of mental ill-health among more masculine, 
performance-oriented societies (e.g., Japan, Ireland) (Arrindell et al., 2004; Arrindell, Steptoe, & 
Wardle, 2003). It has been further posited that taking on a hierarchical perspective in which 
others are viewed as one’s competitors, and engaging in competitive behaviour (e.g., social 
comparisons, striving to avoid inferiority) can be incredibly stressful, not only linked to feelings 
of insecurity and discontent, but also increasing vulnerability to depression and anxiety (Gilbert, 
McEwan, Bellew, Wells, & Mills, 2009). 
 
Body Dissatisfaction and Disordered Eating: The Costs of Appearance-Focused Social 
Comparisons 
 
 Body dissatisfaction—in which one holds negative and dysfunctional beliefs about one’s 
body (Garner, 2002)—is a phenomenon so widespread that it has long been known as 
“normative discontent” (Silberstein, Striegel-Moore, & Rodin, 1987; Spitzer, Henderson, & 
Zivian, 1999). It is also a major risk factor for the development and maintenance of disordered 
eating behaviour and eating disorders (Cash & Deagle, 1997; Corning, Krumm, & Smitham, 
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2006; Stice & Shaw, 2002), which are prevalent, harmful, and costly. Lifetime prevalence rates 
are currently 5-6% for women (Hudson, Hiripi, Pope, & Kessler, 2007), and eating disorders 
have the highest mortality rate of any mental disorder (Sullivan, 2002). 
The pervasiveness of body dissatisfaction is especially concerning in light of the fact that 
the physical appearance domain is one in which competitive perspectives and behaviour are 
pervasive and even encouraged, especially among women (Jackson, 1992). Within the gamut of 
competitive behaviour seen in contemporary society, appearance-focused upward social 
comparisons—that is, comparing oneself unfavourably to another on the basis of physical 
appearance—can be particularly insidious (e.g., Myers & Crowther, 2009). Such comparisons 
can be toxic in an arena in which the illusory concept of the “thin-ideal” presents itself as the 
ultimate comparison standard for the women of Western society. The thin-ideal refers to an 
unrealistically thin body type perpetuated as a rigid standard of beauty by mass media, often in 
airbrushed magazine covers and public advertisements (Dohnt & Tiggemann, 2006; Rodin & 
Striegel-Moore, 1984; Thompson & Stice, 2001). The appearance-focused behaviours and 
conversations of family members and peers—for example, discussing weight loss or dieting 
behaviours—may also endorse the thin-ideal (Dohnt & Tiggemann, 2006; Lev-Ari, 
Baumgartner-Katz, & Zohar, 2014a). Despite the troubling indications that the thin-ideal is 
increasingly at odds with the average woman’s body (MacNeill & Best, 2015), comparisons to 
this unattainable standard make it a powerful contributor to elevated levels of body 
dissatisfaction and disordered eating in Western women (Dohnt & Tiggemann, 2006; Groesz, 
Levine, & Murnen, 2001; Low et al., 2003; Stice, 2002). 
 However, the thin-ideal, as pervasive as it is, is not the only trigger of appearance-
focused social comparisons. Research suggests that for women, body satisfaction can be 
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significantly undermined not just by upward comparisons to thin-ideal espousing celebrities and 
models, but by a single thin peer (Lin & Kulik, 2002). Comparisons made to close others (i.e., 
family and peers) have been shown to greatly influence women’s idea of the ideal body, and may 
contribute to the development of body dissatisfaction. In fact, in the appearance domain, some 
studies have found that the upward comparison target most detrimental to women’s body image 
is their best friend (Lev-Ari, Baumgarten-Katz, & Zohar, 2014a; Lev-Ari, Baumgarten-Katz, & 
Zohar, 2014b). Given the plethora of opportunities in one’s daily life to make such comparisons, 
this is hardly a negligible source of body dissatisfaction.  
 Indeed, a meta-analysis by Myers and Crowther (2009) showed that a high frequency of 
appearance-focused social comparisons was related to higher levels of body dissatisfaction, and 
that this relationship was stronger for women. These findings are unsurprising, given that women 
are more likely to feel evaluated exclusively on the basis of their physical appearance—that is, 
women commonly experience the feeling of being treated and valued by others as nothing but a 
physical body (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Women are also much more likely to make 
upward comparisons in the appearance domain (Morrison, Kalin, & Morrison, 2004). In 
summary, the appearance domain is one in which women are virtually set up to experience 
dissatisfaction by making more social comparisons that leave them feeling unhappier. 
 The mechanics of appearance-focused upward social comparisons are perhaps most 
troubling in their points of divergence from key tenets of social comparison theory. First, 
although Festinger (1954) posited that individuals are more likely to compare themselves to 
relevant or similar others, women frequently make unfavourable appearance comparisons to 
media representations of the thin-ideal who would qualify as dissimilar others, given their 
unrealistic standards (Groesz et al., 2002; Engeln-Maddox, 2005; Myers & Crowther, 2009; 
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Strahan, Wilson, Cressman, & Buote, 2006). Second, although Festinger argued that individuals 
will stop making upward comparisons if they become generally unfavourable or detrimental to 
their self-image, research in the body image domain suggests otherwise. Although the practice is 
not only fruitless but also harmful, women frequently continue to make appearance-related social 
comparisons (Strahan et al., 2006) and make more unfavourable than favourable appearance 
comparisons (Leahey, Crowther, & Mickelson, 2007).  
Even more disconcerting is that these comparisons are costliest to those who are already 
high in body dissatisfaction and/or eating pathology. Groesz and colleagues (2002) found that the 
increase in body dissatisfaction that can result from exposure to thin-ideal images is significantly 
stronger for women who are already high in body dissatisfaction. In a daily diary study using 
Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) to investigate the effects of naturally occurring 
appearance-focused social comparisons, Leahey and colleagues (2007) found that women who 
were high in body dissatisfaction made more comparisons and a greater proportion of upward 
comparisons than women who were low in body dissatisfaction. Furthermore, these upward 
comparisons were linked to an increase in negative affect and body dissatisfaction not just in 
general but on a daily basis. In another EMA study, Leahey, Crowther, and Ciesla (2011) found 
that even among women who were high in body dissatisfaction, upward comparisons were most 
harmful to women who also had eating pathology, showing greater links to negative affect, guilt, 
and thoughts of dieting. Appearance-focused upward social comparisons have also been linked 
to the maintenance of eating disorders. Relative to a control group, patients with bulimia nervosa 
were found in one study to fixate longer on comparison bodies with lower body mass indices 
(BMIs), while they fixated for less time on high BMI comparison bodies. Furthermore, these 
upward comparisons to those with lower BMIs were also associated with a drop in body 
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satisfaction among the patient group, but this drop was not seen in the control group (Blechert, 
Nickert, Caffier, & Tuschen-Caffier, 2009). In the appearance domain then, upward comparisons 
can be seen to perpetuate a virtual cycle of discontent, making women who are already unhappy 
with their bodies unhappier. 
In non-appearance domains, downward comparisons have been shown to have protective 
effects on women’s body satisfaction: women high in body dissatisfaction instructed to make 
downward comparisons to models in non-appearance domains such as relationships, intellect, 
and personality experienced more positive changes in body satisfaction than a control group 
(Lew, Mann, Myers, Taylor, & Bower, 2007). However, little research has examined the effects 
of engaging in downward comparisons in the appearance domain—for example, seeking out less 
attractive others against whom to compare oneself, or looking for particular physical features 
(i.e., skin, hair) on which one is more attractive than a thinner peer. While a few studies (Bailey 
& Ricciardelli, 2010; Martin & Gentry, 1997; van den Berg & Thompson, 2007) have shown 
these comparisons to be associated with higher levels of body satisfaction for women, others 
suggest that downward comparisons in the appearance domain do not always seem to have the 
compensatory, elevating effects that they provide in other domains (Lin & Kulik, 2002; 
Rancourt, Schaefer, Bosson, & Thompson, 2016), and that they may even be detrimental to body 
image and eating behaviour (Lin & Soby, 2016). In other words, in a crucial departure from 
social comparison theory, there may exist an asymmetry in the appearance domain such that 
upward comparisons make women feel worse about their bodies, while downward comparisons 
in this domain do not always necessarily offset these effects by making women feel better about 
their bodies. The latter may be especially true for women who are already vulnerable, for whom 
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downward comparison targets and/or physical features may be hard to come by, and for whom 
any effects of downward comparisons may be short-lived (Leahey et al., 2011).  
 
Social Mentalities Theory: A Novel Perspective 
Insofar as social comparison theory fails to adequately explain the full nature of 
comparisons in the physical appearance domain, with downward comparisons failing to 
consistently alleviate the adverse consequences of women’s appearance-focused upward 
comparisons, a need arises for alternate perspectives from which to understand and intervene 
with women’s maladaptive tendency to engage in unfavourable body comparisons. I propose that 
this need may be addressed through the lens of Gilbert’s (1989, 2000) social mentalities theory.   
Social mentalities theory posits that individuals can adopt various mentalities, or 
mindsets, to guide their interactions with others. Gilbert (2000, p.120) states that “a social 
mentality acts to generate patterns of cognition, affect, and behaviour into meaningful sequences 
that allow for the enactment of social roles” (e.g., caring, sexual, competitive). These roles 
require both a system for detecting signals from others (i.e., to read others’ emotions and 
intentions and work out what role they are trying to impose) and a system for sending signals to 
others (i.e., to communicate what social role one is enacting—for example, acting as an ally vs. a 
competitor) (Gilbert, 2005). Based on the mentality being pursued, “the self” is construed in one 
way (e.g., care-giving, dominant), while “the other” is construed in another (e.g., care-seeking, 
subordinate). Different social mentalities organize our minds in different ways and are embedded 
in various innate motivation systems, and as a result, how we react to social events and/or 
interactions with others is contingent upon the social mentality we have adopted. To provide an 
example, Gilbert (2014) describes that seeing another person cry might be a personally 
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pleasurable experience if one’s current mindset is oriented towards outperforming or hurting 
them, but a distressing one if one’s current mindset is oriented towards caring for them.  
Gilbert (2005) identifies the following as what he considers to be some of the more 
important archetypal social mentalities: care-eliciting, care-giving, formation of alliances, social 
ranking, and sexual.  
1) A care-eliciting mentality directs individuals to form a relationship with another who 
can offer protection and the necessary investment for survival (and in mammals, 
emotional regulation). It addresses the social challenge of having to provide for and 
regulate threats to oneself, especially early on in life. In adopting such a mentality, 
one is oriented towards evaluating proximity to the other, making distress calls, 
searching for the other, and being responsive to their signals of care-giving. 
2) A care-giving mentality directs individuals to form a relationship with another in 
order to invest resources such as time and energy that increase their chances of 
survival, growth, and reproduction. It addresses the social challenge of threat to 
young or vulnerable kin and allies. In adopting such a mentality, one is oriented 
towards responding to distress and evaluating and meeting the needs of the other; in 
humans, empathy and sympathy are also enacted as part of this mentality. 
3) A formation of alliances (i.e., cooperative) mentality directs individuals to form a 
relationship with another for cooperation. It includes the inhibition of aggression, 
sharing-exchange, affiliation, friendships, group living, and reciprocal behaviour. It 
addresses the social challenge of infighting, instead allowing for collaboration to 
solve problems of survival. In adopting such a mentality, one is oriented towards 
making judgments about who is similar to oneself, who is included or excluded from 
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a group, and who may be a good ally; in humans, this mentality also involves an 
orientation towards reciprocation, equity, fairness, and rights. 
4) A social ranking (i.e., competitive) mentality directs individuals to form a 
relationship with another in which one is concerned with one’s relative rank or status 
relative to another. It can lead the individual to directly compete for resources, to 
choose behaviours that will increase and maintain rank/status (e.g., dominance/ 
leader), to concede to those of higher rank/status (e.g., submission/follower), and to 
compete for selection by others in certain roles (e.g., mate, ally, leader). It addresses 
the social challenge of infighting, instead promoting social cohesion. Importantly, in 
humans, social rank is thought to depend more on one’s social attractiveness (e.g., 
popularity, looks, intelligence, wealth) than one’s physical strength. 
5) A sexual mentality directs individuals to form a relationship with another for sexual 
behaviour. This includes attracting and being attracted to others, courting, conception, 
and retention of mates. Strategies and combinations of emotions and motives might 
differ based on whether the goal involves short-term or long-term sexual bonds. 
Importantly, one’s predisposition to adopt or eschew certain social mentalities can be 
shaped by early experiences, especially those of safeness and threat. For example, Gilbert (2005) 
suggests that our potential for warmth and compassion, elements of the care-giving mentality, 
emerges not only from our temperament, but also from our experiences of warmth and care from 
others. In our early social world, others (usually caregivers) in our environment may create a 
sense of safeness, offer warmth and validation, and instil in us a sense of being capable of liked 
or loved; consequently, one may become oriented towards seeking out others with whom to 
enact cooperative and affiliative strategies. However, if one’s caregivers fail to create this sense 
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of safeness or offer warmth, and instead instil a sense of threat or shame, the consequences may 
be under-stimulation of one’s positive affect and warmth systems, and over-activation of one’s 
threat-defence systems (Perry, Pollard, Blakley, Baker, & Vigilante, 1995). A child who grows 
up in such an environment may therefore come to see the world as a dangerous place (Gilbert, 
2005). 
Individuals without this internalized sense of warmth, who may feel un-liked or unloved 
by others, can often become highly competitive and rejection-sensitive, overly oriented towards 
striving or making attempts to ‘earn’ their place (Gilbert, 2004, 2005). The social mentality that 
is typically deployed to cope with the frequent social threats perceived in such an individual’s 
world is the competitive mentality. This is not to say, however, that people from insecure or 
difficult early environments necessarily lack the capacity for warmth or compassion, or that all 
individuals who are securely attached turn out to be warm and compassionate; indeed, there are 
many influences aside from our early environment that can activate our social mentalities—such 
as genes, temperament, and later experiences in life (Gilbert, 2005). However, adopting a care-
giving or care-seeking mentality may be a foreign and even scary practice for many of these 
individuals from insecure early environments, and a competitive mentality is likely to feel safer. 
Within the framework of Gilbert’s (2000) social mentalities theory then, when 
individuals make social comparisons, they are adopting a competitive mindset, in which the self 
and other are ranked relative to each other (i.e., superior/inferior) in a given domain. As 
discussed earlier, while such a mindset can serve various functions (i.e., accurate self-evaluation, 
self-enhancement) (Wood, 1989) and be evolutionarily adaptive in helping individuals gather 
information about their rank relative to others to in turn guide their behaviour, it also has many 
downsides and its perpetual activation is associated with increased mental ill-health (Arrindell et 
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al., 2003; Arrindell et al., 2004; Gilbert, 1989; Murray & Lopez, 1996). I suggest that the 
unfavourable upward social comparisons that drive body dissatisfaction may be underpinned by 
such a competitive mindset.  
Preliminary research has shown associations between various features characteristic of a 
competitive mindset and disordered eating, appearance anxiety, and drive for thinness (Bellew, 
Gilbert, Mills, McEwan, Gale, 2006; Pinto-Gouveia, Ferreira, & Duarte, 2012). Indeed, a study 
by Pinto-Gouveia and colleagues (2012) found links between the following elements of the 
competitive mentality,—namely, external shame (i.e., believing that one is negatively evaluated 
by and disdained by others), upward appearance comparisons (i.e., feeling inferior to others on 
the basis of appearance), and insecure striving (i.e., feeling constantly pressured to compete with 
others to avoid inferiority)—and further found that these elements predict body dissatisfaction 
and can lead to drive for thinness among women from the general population as well as those 
with eating disorders. Finally, being overly dependent upon a competitive mindset can be 
especially detrimental for a species such as ours for whom feelings of safeness and well-being 
evolved to require compassion, connection to, and acceptance and inclusion from others 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Bowlby, 1969/1982). Even when the focus is on one’s relatively 
superior qualities, as in downward comparisons, such a strategy, when relied upon almost 
exclusively, maintains a competitive orientation in one’s relationships with others that can lead 
to divisiveness and hostility; and one’s sense of self-worth becomes tied to putting other people 
down. 
To that end, Gilbert’s (2005) conceptualization of a caregiving, compassion-based 
mentality may be a promising alternative from which we can intervene with people’s tendency to 
approach others with a competitive mentality more generally and with women’s maladaptive 
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tendency to engage in unfavourable body comparisons more specifically. In line with Bowlby’s 
(1969/1982) theories, Gilbert (2005) suggests that the human capacity to be compassionate is 
evolutionarily hard-wired, arising from human motivation to care for offspring. In addressing 
potential threats to young or vulnerable kin and allies, the caregiving mentality orients 
individuals towards forming relationships with others to invest resources (e.g., time, energy) that 
increases the likelihood of successful survival and reproduction. One is oriented towards 
responding to distress and evaluating and fulfilling the other’s needs. Evoking such a mentality 
can promote secure and enduring forms of well-being that are not contingent on viewing others 
as inferior (Gilbert, 2005). When this mindset is adopted, individuals are motivated by 
compassion rather than competition, and seek to support and connect with others (Gilbert, 2005, 
2010). This mentality may therefore be a helpful antidote to the competitive mentality that 
underpins harmful appearance comparisons. 
 
Practising Compassion and Self-Compassion in a Competitive World 
 Compassion has been defined in various ways, but a recent review of definitions suggests 
that it is “a cognitive, affective, and behavioural process consisting of the following five 
elements that refer to both self- and other-compassion: 1) Recognizing suffering; 2) 
Understanding the universality of suffering in human experience; 3) Feeling empathy for the 
person suffering and connecting with the distress (emotional resonance); 4) Tolerating 
uncomfortable feelings aroused in response to the suffering person (e.g., distress, anger, fear) so 
remaining open to the accepting of the person suffering; and 5) Motivation to act/acting to 
alleviate suffering” (Strauss et al., 2016, p. 19). 
 The evidence for the benefits of compassion are overwhelming in the literature. Giving or 
feeling compassion has the capacity to buffer the effects of stress on well-being by cultivating 
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psychological resilience and increasing adaptive profiles of reactivity to stress (Cosley, McCoy, 
Saslow, & Epel, 2010; Poulin, Brown, Dillard, & Smith, 2013; Seppala, Hutcherson, Nguyen, 
Doty, & Gross, 2014). It has been shown to induce significant changes in fostering social 
connection: Hutcherson, Seppala, and Gross (2008) found in a lab study that compared to a 
closely-matched control task, a brief 7-minute loving-kindness meditation exercise in which one 
directs compassion and wishes for well-being towards real or imagined others increased feelings 
of social connection and positive affect towards strangers both implicitly and explicitly. It also 
has a powerful influence on physical health (Brown, Nesse, Vinokur, & Smith, 2003; Konrath, 
Fuhrel-Forbis, Lou, & Brown, 2012): one study examining the mortality risk among volunteers 
and non-volunteers found that volunteers who were truly motivated by compassion were at lower 
risk for mortality 4 years later, especially if they volunteered regularly and frequently (Konrath 
et al., 2012).  
Compassion is also incredibly beneficial in its ability to foster self-compassion 
(Hermanto & Zuroff, 2016). Self-compassion is an unconditional form of positive self-regard 
that involves the tendency to respond to personal suffering and inadequacies with: kindness 
rather than judgment; a mindful attitude rather than one of over-identification; and the view that 
suffering is a common human experience rather than an isolating one (Neff, 2003a). Meanwhile, 
Gilbert (2005) conceptualized self-compassion as a form of self-to-self relating, in which one’s 
care-giving mindset is activated to attend to one’s own signals of distress. The link between 
compassion for self and compassion for others has been established in a variety of cross-
sectional, brain imaging, and experimental studies (Crocker & Canevello, 2008; Longe et al., 
2010; Neff & Beretvas, 2013). In a study examining the antecedents of self-compassion, 
Hermanto and Zuroff (2016) found that individuals who displayed a combination of high care-
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seeking and high caregiving tendencies had the highest levels of self-compassion. Higher levels 
of self-compassion have also been found to be related to higher levels of other-focused concerns 
such as perspective-taking and forgiveness (Neff & Pommier, 2013). Another study found that 
the act of recalling memories of providing support to others, and actually providing care in a lab 
task, increased state self-compassion (Breines & Chen, 2013). In other words, the research 
suggests that one’s ability to relate compassionately to others is fundamentally linked to one’s 
ability to relate compassionately to oneself. 
 
Choosing Compassion over Competition 
 The intent of the present review is not to vilify the competitive mindset, or the practice of 
making social comparisons. After all, the competitive mentality evolved to serve important 
functions indirectly conducive to survival and reproductive success. Like other social 
mentalities, it serves to help people problem-solve important social challenges—in this case, 
aiding in gathering information about one’s rank relative to others, and in guiding one’s 
behaviour in social hierarchies, competing for things one needs or wants such as mates or 
resources. 
 However, as discussed above, when individuals become overly dependent upon a 
competitive orientation, or even exclusively reliant upon it, this competitive, rank-focused 
mentality can start to become a costly perspective to hold. I believe this to be especially true for 
women who make social comparisons in the appearance domain: they continue to make 
appearance-related social comparisons—and consequently, remain in a competitive mentality—
even when the practice becomes futile, or worse, detrimental to their well-being. In effect, within 
the appearance domain, I suggest that many women, especially those who are already unhappy 
with their bodies, are virtually stuck in this competitive mindset, and thereby remain in a 
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perpetual cycle of discontent where they become even unhappier. More alarmingly, there is 
evidence of an asymmetry in the appearance domain such that after experiencing the negative 
consequences of having made upward comparisons, remaining in a competitive mentality to 
make oneself feel better by using downward comparisons (as social comparison theory might 
typically suggest) does not provide emotional relief, especially for women who are already 
dissatisfied with their bodies. 
 Even when one is able to successfully cope with social threats using downward 
comparisons, the persistent use of such a strategy is still in keeping with an orientation that is 
often based on disunity and antagonism, and as a result can be toxic to oneself and one’s 
relationships with others. Effectively, in relying upon a competitive mentality, in order to 
preserve or increase one’s own sense of self-worth, one pays the price of putting others down. 
This can be incredibly harmful for a social species such as ours, for whom secure forms of well-
being are drawn from feeling connected with others, and accepted and valued by others. 
Furthermore, within the appearance domain, where women often tend to compare themselves not 
only to media models and strangers, but also to those closest to them in their social environment, 
the people serving as targets for the divisive and often hostile thoughts associated with social 
comparisons are most likely to be family members and peers—people that one cares about and 
from whom distancing oneself will inevitably have social and emotional costs. Finally, in a 
world where others are indiscriminately viewed as competitors, one’s social environment can 
come to be seen as a very threatening place, making feelings of safeness and well-being elusive.  
 Given its evolutionary social function of orienting the individual towards caring for 
others, taking on a caregiving mentality appears to be a promising way to counteract the perils of 
reliance upon the competitive mentality. Importantly, in switching from a competitive mindset to 
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a care-giving mindset, one is able to shift the focus away from constantly taking stock of and 
ranking others as competitors who are superior or inferior to oneself—especially one’s loved 
ones. The caregiving mentality, which is built upon empathy and attention to the needs of others, 
will be able to promote rather than undermine one’s relationships with close others. This shift 
may also lessen the sense of threat felt in one’s social environment, instead promoting a sense of 
safeness. 
 Furthermore, research suggests that the construct of compassion, which underlies the 
caregiving mentality, can in itself be extremely beneficial to one’s physical and mental well-
being. In addition to buffering the effects of stress and lowering mortality risk, providing 
compassion to others can cultivate psychological resilience and foster social connection. One’s 
ability to provide compassion to others is also linked to provide self-compassion.  
Although the effects of cultivating compassion towards others have been studied in terms 
of physical and mental health, little research to date has examined the effects of cultivating 
compassion for others on one’s body image or one’s tendency to make social comparisons. In the 
present research, I examine whether the cultivation of compassion—and by extension, the 
caregiving mentality—may be an invaluable resource for women struggling to break the 
aforementioned “cycle of discontent” perpetuated by the competitive mentality they tend to rely 
on in the appearance domain. 
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The Present Study 
Social Comparison Theory 
Social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) proposes that individuals compare themselves 
to others to determine their standing in life’s various domains. These comparisons can be 
upward, in which the other is perceived to be superior in a given domain, or downward, in which 
the other is perceived to be inferior in a given domain. Downward comparisons generally 
produce positive affect and boost self-esteem (Gibbons, 1986; Hakmiller, 1966; Lemyre & 
Smith, 1985, Morse & Gergen, 1970). They often assist in one’s efforts for self-enhancement in 
the face of social threats (Wills, 1981), and can serve as an important coping strategy in one’s 
adjustment to distressing life events (Wood et al., 1985).  Although upward comparisons 
generally produce adverse consequences in the form of negative affect and decreased self-esteem 
(Morse & Gergen, 1970; Salovey & Rodin, 1984), they can provide useful information about 
how one should evaluate oneself in a given domain, and can sometimes be a source of self-
improvement and motivation (Buunk et al., 1990; Collins, 1996; Helgeson & Taylor, 1993). 
 
The Costs of Appearance-Focused Social Comparisons 
The physical appearance domain is one in which the practice of making social 
comparisons is prevalent and even encouraged, especially among women (Jackson, 1992). 
Although in non-appearance domains, comparing oneself to others can be beneficial (Buunk et 
al., 1990; Collins, 1996; Helgeson & Taylor, 1993; Wood et al., 1985), there is very little 
evidence to this effect in the realm of physical appearance. For women in particular, a high 
frequency of appearance-focused social comparisons is strongly related to higher levels of body 
dissatisfaction (Myers & Crowther, 2009). Women are also much more likely to make upward 
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appearance-focused comparisons than men (Morrison et al., 2004), and to feel distressed and 
body-dissatisfied after they make them (Strahan et al., 2006). 
 Contrary to what social comparison theory would predict, women often continue to make 
appearance-focused social comparisons when the practice becomes unrewarding and even 
detrimental to their body image (Strahan et al., 2006). Research also suggests that these 
comparisons are costliest to those who are already high in body dissatisfaction and/or eating 
pathology (Groesz et al., 2002; Leahey et al., 2011). Compared to those lower in body 
dissatisfaction, women who are higher in body dissatisfaction make a higher number of and 
greater proportion of upward comparisons; these comparisons are also linked to increases in 
negative affect and body dissatisfaction (Leahey et al., 2007). Upward comparisons in this 
domain are also implicated in the maintenance of eating disorders (Blechert et al., 2009). In the 
appearance domain then, upward comparisons appear to be making women who are already 
unhappy with their bodies unhappier. 
 A natural question then becomes, how to intervene with these comparisons and the 
distress they cause. Within the framework of social comparison theory, an obvious idea would be 
to encourage women to make more downward comparisons. These could take the form of 
finding less attractive women with whom to compare oneself and/or finding domains in which 
one is superior to one’s attractive comparison target. While some studies have found that 
downward comparisons made in both appearance and non-appearance domains can have 
protective effects on body satisfaction (Bailey & Ricciardelli, 2010; Lew et al., 2007; Martin & 
Gentry, 1997; van den Berg & Thompson, 2007), others suggest that in the appearance domain, 
downward comparisons do not always provide the uplifting effects that are seen in other domains 
(Lin & Kulik, 2002; Lin & Soby, 2016; Rancourt et al., 2016). For example, in one study that 
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exposed women to different images of peers as comparison targets in a “dating game” scenario, 
those presented with the image of a thin peer experienced a reduction in body satisfaction and 
confidence, while those presented with the image of an oversized peer experienced no 
compensatory effects on body satisfaction and confidence (Lin & Kulik, 2002). Another study by 
Lin and Soby (2016) goes even further in suggesting that downward comparisons may be 
detrimental to body image. The authors found that women who frequently made downward 
appearance comparisons were more likely to show an increased drive for thinness and dietary 
restraint, and that those who engaged in both upward and downward appearance comparisons 
endorsed more maladaptive body image concerns and behaviours relative to women who only 
made comparisons in one direction. In conclusion, and contrary to what social comparison theory 
would predict, the strategy of facilitating downward appearance comparisons may have limited 
success in alleviating body dissatisfaction (Leahey et al., 2011), suggesting a need for new 
theoretical perspectives from which to approach the problem of recurrent and harmful 
appearance comparisons. 
 
Social Mentalities Theory 
We propose that Gilbert’s (1989, 2000) social mentalities theory may be a promising new 
lens from which to understand and intervene with women’s maladaptive tendency to engage in 
unfavourable appearance-focused social comparisons. This theory postulates that individuals can 
adopt various mentalities, or mindsets, in their interactions with others. These different 
mentalities are thought to guide the formation of relationships that further the evolutionary goals 
of survival and reproduction. These include relationships based on care-giving/care-seeking, co-
operation and reciprocity, dominance/submissiveness, and sex. Each mentality serves to organize 
one’s mind in a specific way, triggering certain patterns of attention, thinking, feeling, and 
21 
 
behaving that allow for the enactment of these different evolutionarily important relationships 
(Gilbert, 2000, 2005). Based on the social mentality one adopts, “the self” is construed in one 
way, for example as care-giving or dominant, while “the other” is construed in another, for 
example, as care-seeking or subordinate. As a result, one’s approach and reaction to interactions 
with others depend upon the social mentality adopted at the time. For example, seeing another 
person suffer might be a pleasurable experience if one’s current mindset is oriented towards 
competing with them, but a distressing experience if one’s current mindset is oriented towards 
caring for them (Gilbert, 2014). 
  
Compassion vs. Competition 
Relevant to social comparisons, Gilbert (2000) proposed that a social ranking or 
competitive mentality orients individuals towards appraising their rank or status relative to 
another, and towards basing their behaviours – for example, whether to dominate or submit – 
upon this appraisal. From this mentality, others are seen as competitors for desired, limited 
resources (e.g., food, mates). Adopting the framework of social mentalities theory, then, 
individuals making social comparisons—be these upward or downward—are in a competitive 
mindset: the focus is on ranking oneself relative to others as either superior or inferior.  
When individuals feel insecure in their social environments—as many body-dissatisfied 
women tend to do—there is evidence that they can become more rank-focused (Gilbert et al., 
2009b), which is consistent with the link between frequency of appearance comparisons and 
body dissatisfaction (Myers & Crowther, 2009). Preliminary research also suggests that 
individuals who endorse a more competitive mindset have more disordered eating and a higher 
drive for thinness (Bellew et al., 2006; Pinto-Gouveia et al., 2012). We suggest that even when 
making regular downward comparisons, where the focus is on one’s relatively superior rank in a 
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given domain, one maintains a competitive orientation with the people in one’s environment. 
This orientation may lead not only to body dissatisfaction but also to disunity and antagonism; 
and one’s sense of self-worth is effectively tied to putting others down. An overreliance on the 
competitive mentality can therefore be psychologically, socially, and physically harmful. 
We therefore propose that rather than intervening with recurrent upward comparisons by 
encouraging downward comparisons, which would perpetuate a competitive orientation, it may 
be more advantageous to shift people to a different mindset altogether. Specifically, Gilbert’s 
(2005) conceptualization of a caregiving, compassion-based mentality, may be a promising 
alternative and antidote to the perils of dependence upon the competitive mentality, especially in 
the appearance domain. Consistent with Bowlby’s (1969/1982) work, Gilbert (2005) posits that 
the human capacity to be caring and compassionate is evolutionarily hard-wired, arising from 
one’s motivation to care for offspring. When individuals take on a caregiving mentality, they 
seek to support and connect with others rather than trying to establish their relative rank as they 
would in the competitive mentality; others are seen as fellow human beings who are similar to 
self in their experiences of suffering and desires to be happy (Gilbert, 2005, 2010).  
There is a large body of evidence documenting the benefits of activating a caregiving 
mentality. For example, the Buddhist tradition of loving-kindness meditation (Salzberg, 1995), 
rooted in loving-kindness, which Salzberg (2011) describes as “a quality of the heart that realizes 
how connected we all are…a form of inclusiveness of caring,” (p. 178) encourages its 
practitioners to direct well-wishes toward a range of individuals. This approach, which is likely 
rooted in the caregiving mentality, has yielded a plethora of psychological and even physical 
benefits. Studies suggest that it can increase positive affect, promote resilience, and foster 
feelings of social connection even towards strangers (Fredrickson, Cohn, Coffey, Pek, & Finkel, 
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2008; Hutcherson et al., 2008; Seppala et al., 2014). One study by Fredrickson and colleagues 
(2008) showed that, over time, the practice of loving-kindness meditation produced increases in 
daily positive affect, which led to gains in personal resources such as increased mindfulness, 
more positive social relationships, and better physical health; these gains in turn increased life 
satisfaction and decreased depressive symptoms. In another study, patients with chronic low 
back pain who were taught loving-kindness meditation in an 8-week program reported reductions 
in pain, anger, and psychological distress, while a comparison group receiving standard care 
showed no changes (Carson et al., 2005).  
Research has also overwhelmingly shown that compassion, another key output of the 
caregiving mentality, is beneficial to physical and mental well-being.  According to a recent 
review of definitions and measures of compassion, compassion is “a cognitive, affective, and 
behavioural process consisting of the following five elements that refer to both self- and other-
compassion: 1) Recognizing suffering; 2) Understanding the universality of suffering in human 
experience; 3) Feeling empathy for the person suffering and connecting with the distress 
(emotional resonance); 4) Tolerating uncomfortable feelings aroused in response to the suffering 
person (e.g., distress, anger, fear) so remaining open to the accepting of the person suffering; and 
5) Motivation to act/acting to alleviate suffering” (Strauss et al., 2016, p. 19). Cultivating 
compassionate feelings and/or providing compassion-motivated help for others can lower 
mortality risk, cultivate psychological resilience, buffer the effects of stress, and foster social 
connection with others (Brown et al., 2003; Cosley et al., 2010; Hutcherson et al., 2008; Konrath 
et al., 2012; Poulin et al., 2013; Seppala et al., 2014). Compassion is also powerful in its ability 
to foster self-compassion (Breines & Chen, 2013; Hermanto & Zuroff, 2016; Neff & Pommier, 
2013), which is the tendency to respond to personal distress with care and support (Gilbert, 2005; 
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Neff, 2003a). Self-compassion is an important contributor to well-being (Zessin, Dickhäuser, & 
Garbade, 2015) and is associated with fewer body image concerns and greater body image 
acceptance (e.g., Albertson, Neff, & Dill-Shackleford, 2015; Braun, Park, & Gorin, 2016; Kelly, 
Vimalakanthan, & Carter, 2014; Kelly, Vimalakanthan, & Miller, 2014). 
Although there are well-documented benefits to cultivating a caregiving orientation 
toward others, no studies to our knowledge have examined the effects of this approach on body 
image. We suggest that activation of the caregiving mentality may halt the “cycle of discontent” 
perpetuated by the competitive mentality, which appears to be a commonly-adopted mindset in 
the appearance domain. By learning to shift from the competitive mindset to the caregiving 
mindset, women may be able to reduce their vigilance toward and constant tracking of their 
perceived rank in the appearance domain. This shift may also decrease the sense of threat that 
women may feel in their social environment, promoting social safeness—a sense of feeling 
warm, safe, and connected with others in one’s social environment (Gilbert et al., 2009a)—rather 
than competition with others. The overall consequences of this shift should include a decrease in 
social comparisons and body dissatisfaction, and an increase in feelings of social safeness. In 
general, this shift may promote more secure and enduring forms of well-being than those that 
those that are rooted in comparing oneself to others (Gilbert, 2005, 2010). 
 
Study Objectives 
 The present study’s primary objective was to investigate the effectiveness of adopting a 
caregiving mindset in alleviating the body dissatisfaction and other negative consequences that 
may result from making appearance-focused social comparisons. To do so, we randomly 
assigned college women to one of three brief interventions that involved practicing a particular 
strategy each time they made an unfavourable appearance comparison over a 48-hour window. In 
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the Caregiving condition, women were taught to cultivate feelings of compassion and loving-
kindness toward their comparison targets; in the Competition condition, women were asked to 
make downward comparisons to their target on other domains; and in the Control condition, 
women were asked to distract themselves with a counting task, which would allow us to rule out 
the possibility that general cognitive engagement post-comparisons accounted for outcomes. 
 We hypothesized that after 48 hours of practicing their assigned strategy, women in the 
Caregiving condition would, relative to women in the Competition or Control conditions, report: 
1) less body dissatisfaction; 2) fewer comparisons related to their body, eating, or exercise 
behaviour; and 3) higher levels of social safeness.  
Secondary hypotheses investigated the moderating effects of baseline eating disorder 
symptomatology and trait compassion on these outcomes. Regarding eating disorder pathology, 
research suggests that making comparisons differentially affects women with and without eating 
pathology; specifically, even among women high in body dissatisfaction, comparisons are most 
harmful to women who also have eating pathology (Leahey et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
comparisons have also been linked to the maintenance of eating disorders (Blechert et al., 2009). 
Relatedly, women who seek help for body image concerns tend to be those who are high in 
eating pathology (or those with an actual eating disorder). Therefore, it would be beneficial to 
determine which of our interventions would be most useful for this more vulnerable group in 
particular. For these reasons, we felt that baseline eating disorder symptomatology would be an 
important moderator variable. We hypothesized that it would be those who were struggling 
most—that is, those higher in eating pathology—who might be most entrenched in the 
competitive mentality, and therefore most likely to benefit from the novel approach of shifting to 
the caregiving mentality.  
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Trait compassion appeared to be a natural candidate for another moderating variable. 
Given that compassion is a key output of the caregiving mentality, we thought it would be 
important to determine whether individuals who were already high in this trait would stand to 
gain from our Caregiving intervention. We hypothesized that women who were more 
compassionate might not benefit as much from this intervention as others as the Caregiving 
approach may fail to provide them with new perspectives from which to address their appearance 
comparisons. Drawing on this same rationale, we hypothesized that those lower in trait 
compassion would experience the greatest gains from shifting to the caregiving mentality, given 
that this mindset offers a new perspective from which to address their struggles. 
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Method 
Overview of the Procedure 
 The present study comprised multiple parts, including two online sessions, an in-lab 
session, and a 48-hour “contractual period”. The first session (15 min.) took place online and 
consisted of self-report measures that would be examined as moderator variables in data 
analyses. The second session (1 hr.), which included pre-intervention questionnaires and the 
experimental manipulation, took place in the lab at least 24 hours after the first session. The key 
intervention period of the study was the 48-hour period following the in-lab session, during 
which participants practiced the randomly assigned self-help strategy that had been taught to 
them in the lab. Finally, the third session (15 min.) took place online at the end of the 48-hour 
contractual period, and consisted of post-intervention measures. 
 
Participants 
 Female undergraduate students were recruited via an online research participant pool and 
via advertisements posted campus-wide. In the interest of greater external validity, we felt that it 
would be important to be transparent about the nature and purpose of the study. That is, in the 
“real world”, women would be seeking out and performing these interventions with full 
knowledge of why they were doing so. As a result, the study was titled “Self-Help Strategies for 
Body Dissatisfaction” on recruitment materials. Furthermore, the description also stated that 
potential participants might not find themselves suitable for the study if they did not routinely 
compare their physical appearance to that of other women at least a few times a day. This caveat 
was not a formal exclusion criterion, given that some women may not entirely be aware of the 
frequency of their comparisons. The study was restricted to female participants due to research 
suggesting that while both men and women make appearance-related comparisons, women make 
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more upward comparisons about their bodies; these comparisons are also linked to greater body 
image dysfunction among women (Strahan et al., 2006; Thomas & Heinberg, 1993). An all-
female sample would also facilitate ease of comparison with extant research in the field. Students 
participated in the study for either a combination of 1.5 bonus participation credits allocated 
towards psychology courses and $5, or a total of $20. Those who withdrew from the study prior 
to completion were remunerated for the portions in which they had participated.  
Seventy-seven participants signed up for the study; of these, 14 failed to schedule or 
attend the lab session where they would have been randomly assigned to a condition and learned 
about the intervention, and were excluded from analyses. Of the 63 remaining participants, six 
failed to complete post-intervention measures: this included three participants from the 
Caregiving condition (out of 21), one from the Competition condition (out of 22), and two from 
the Control condition (out of 20). The final sample consisted of 57 female undergraduates who 
completed all pre- and post-intervention measures. The mean age was 19.90 (SD = 2.06), while 
the mean body mass index (BMI) of the sample was 22.17 (SD = 3.92). Ethnic composition was 
as follows: 43.4% White/Caucasian, 28.3% East Asian, 15.1% South Asian, 3.8% Black/African, 
3.8% Southeast Asian, 3.8% West Indian/Caribbean, and 1.9% Middle Eastern. 
Measures 
Moderator variables. Participants completed a short battery of online questionnaires the 
week before, and no less than 24 hours before, their scheduled in-lab session. These 
questionnaires assessed participants’ general rather than state-like tendencies and can thus be 
seen as more dispositional measures. The two measures that were pertinent to the present 
analyses are described below. 
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 Eating Disorder Examination Questionnaire (EDE-Q; Fairburn, 2008). The EDE-Q is a 
28-item questionnaire measuring eating disorder symptomatology over the previous 28 days. It 
consists of four different subscales: Dietary Restraint (e.g., “Have you had a definite desire to 
have an empty stomach with the aim of influencing your shape or weight?”), Eating Concern 
(e.g., “Have you had a definite fear of losing control over eating?”), Shape Concern (e.g., “Have 
you had a definite desire to have a totally flat stomach?”), and Weight Concern (e.g., “Have you 
had a strong desire to lose weight?”). The items that form part of the subscale and global scores 
are rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 0 (No days/Not at all/None of the times) to 6 
(Every day/Markedly/Every time). Subscale means are averaged to yield a composite score of 
global eating disorder pathology, which was of primary interest in the present study. The EDE-Q 
has good test-retest reliability (Luce & Crowther, 1999), and Cronbach’s alpha for the EDE-Q 
Global score in our sample was 0.95, indicating excellent internal consistency. The mean global 
score was 2.58 (SD = 1.37), which falls within one SD of the mean of 1.65 (SD = 1.30) reported 
in a sample of American college women (Quick & Byrd-Bredbenner, 2013), as well as the mean 
of 1.52 (SD = 1.25) reported in a general population sample of Australian women (Mond, Hay, 
Rodgers, & Owen, 2006). Our sample’s slightly higher mean may be attributed to our 
advertisement as a study of “Self-Help Strategies for Body Dissatisfaction”, which could have 
attracted participants with higher eating pathology. 
 Compassion Scale (Pommier, 2011). The Compassion Scale is a 24-item questionnaire 
measuring one’s general tendency to feel compassion for others. It was modelled after Neff’s 
(2003b) Self-Compassion Scale and consists of six different subscales, of which items on the 
latter three “negative” subscales are reverse-scored: Kindness (e.g., “My heart goes out to people 
who are unhappy.”), Common Humanity (e.g., “Everyone feels down sometimes, it is part of 
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being human.”), Mindfulness (e.g., “I pay careful attention when other people talk to me.”), 
Indifference (e.g., “I don’t concern myself with other people’s problems.”), Separation (e.g., “I 
don’t feel emotionally connected to people in pain.”), and Disengagement (e.g., “I don’t think 
much about the concerns of others.”). Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 
(Almost never) to 5 (Almost Always). Subscale means are averaged to yield a composite score of 
trait compassion. Cronbach’s alpha in our sample was 0.90, indicating excellent internal 
consistency. The mean compassion score was 4.12 (SD = 0.54), which falls within one SD of the 
mean of 3.57 (SD = 0.61) reported in a cross-validation study of the Compassion Scale 
(Pommier, 2011) using a mixed-gender sample of undergraduate students. 
 Dependent variables. Participants completed the following measures on two occasions: 
1) in the lab session immediately before being introduced to their assigned self-help strategy, and 
2) online from home at the end of their 48-hour intervention contract. In both instances, 
instructions on all measures were amended to ask participants to report on their experiences over 
the preceding 48-hour window.  
Social Safeness and Pleasure Scale (SSPS; Gilbert et al., 2009a). The SSPS is an 11-item 
questionnaire measuring the extent to which individuals experience their social worlds as a safe, 
warm, and soothing environment. Sample items include “I feel secure and wanted”, and “I feel 
connected to others”. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Almost never) to 5 
(Almost all the time). Scores on each of the items are averaged to yield a composite score of 
social safeness. Cronbach’s alpha in our sample was 0.94, indicating excellent internal 
consistency. The mean social safeness score was 3.43 (SD = 0.85), which falls within one SD of 
the mean of 3.61 (SD = 0.70) reported in the development of the SSPS (Gilbert et al., 2009a) 
using a sample of mixed-gender undergraduate students. 
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Body Shape Questionnaire – 16-item B version (BSQ-16B; Evans & Dolan, 1993). The BSQ-
16B measures body dissatisfaction. Sample items include “Have you felt excessively large and 
rounded?”, and “Have you been afraid that you might become fat (or fatter)?” Items are rated on 
a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Never) to 6 (Always). Scores on each of the items are 
summed to yield a composite score of body dissatisfaction. Cronbach’s alpha in our sample was 
0.95, indicating excellent internal consistency. The mean body dissatisfaction score was 55.89 
(SD = 17.36), which falls within one SD of the mean of 40.0 (SD = 16.35) reported in a 
validation study of the BSQ-16B (Evans & Dolan, 1993) using a sample of British women 
attending a family planning and well woman clinic. Our sample’s slightly higher mean may be 
attributed to our advertisement as a study of “Self-Help Strategies for Body Dissatisfaction”, 
which could have attracted participants with higher body dissatisfaction. 
Body, Eating, and Exercise Comparison Orientation Measure (BEECOM; Fitzsimmons-
Craft, Bardone-Cone, & Harney, 2012). The BEECOM is an 18-item questionnaire measuring 
eating disorder-related comparison orientation, which is the extent to which individuals compare 
their body, their eating habits, and their exercise habits to others. It consists of three different 
subscales: Body Comparison Orientation (e.g., “I compare my body shape to that of my peers.”), 
Eating Comparison Orientation (e.g., “During meals, I compare what I am eating to what others 
area eating.”), and Exercise Comparison Orientation (e.g., “When I work out, I evaluate how 
hard my workout was compared to how hard my friends say they worked out.”). Items are rated 
on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Never) to 7 (Always). Item scores are summed to yield 
each of the subscale scores, which are in turn summed to yield a composite score of eating 
disorder-related comparison orientation. The BEECOM has high test-retest reliability 
(Fitzsimmons-Craft et al., 2012), and Cronbach’s alpha in our sample for the total scale score 
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was 0.96, indicating excellent internal consistency. The mean eating disorder-related comparison 
orientation score in our sample was 76.80 (SD = 22.94), which falls within one SD of the mean 
of a sample of young college women reported in the validation of the BEECOM, 67.68 (SD = 
23.84) (Fitzsimmons-Craft et al., 2012). 
 Intervention credibility and compliance. Participants completed a measure of 
intervention credibility in the lab session immediately after rehearsing their assigned self-help 
strategy. Participants also answered questions about compliance with their assigned self-help 
strategy during the 48-hour contract period, using an online questionnaire after the period had 
ended. 
Credibility/Expectancy Questionnaire (CEQ; Devilly & Borkovec, 2000). The CEQ is a 
6-item questionnaire measuring individuals’ expectancies about a given intervention and their 
beliefs in its credibility. The questionnaire was modified for the purposes of this study. 
Specifically, the wording of items was altered in two cases: instead of “therapy” or “treatment”, 
the word “strategy” was used; and instead of “trauma symptoms”, the phrase “body 
dissatisfaction” was used. Four items are rated on a 9-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (Not at 
all logical/Not at all useful/Not at all confident/Not at all) to 9 (Very logical/Very useful/Very 
confident/Very much), while two are rated on a 0-100% scale in 10% increments. A score for 
Credibility is derived from the mean of the first three items (e.g., “At this point, how logical does 
the strategy offered to you seem?”) while a score for Expectancy is derived from the mean of the 
last three items (e.g., If you were to practice this strategy for the next month, how much 
improvement in your body dissatisfaction do you think will occur?”). The CEQ has good test-
retest reliability (Devilly & Borkovec, 2000), and Cronbach’s alpha in our sample was 0.91, 
indicating excellent internal consistency. 
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  Compliance items. In the course of collecting data on participants’ experiences with their 
assigned self-help strategy during the 48-hour contract period, they answered two different 
questions measuring compliance. On the first item, in which participants were asked “On what 
percentage of the comparisons that you made did you implement this strategy as instructed?” 
they provided a rating from 0-100%. On the second item, in which participants were asked 
“When you implemented this strategy as instructed, how much effort did you put into 
implementing this strategy?”, they provided a rating on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 0 
(Not at all) to 4 (Extremely).  
 
Procedure 
 Interested participants were directed to a link to a Qualtrics survey made available via the 
online participant pool. The Information-Consent Letter was presented and consent was also 
obtained at this time; this process was repeated at every point of subsequent participation. Next, 
participants were presented with the survey assessing the moderator variables described above. 
 In-lab session. Participants were scheduled for an in-lab session with a researcher which 
generally took place anywhere one to eight days after completing their online questionnaires. 
Participants were first asked if they had any questions or concerns about the Information-
Consent Letter and were then oriented to the procedures for the in-lab session. Participants 
completed all in-lab procedures on a desktop computer located in a private room. All study tasks 
were delivered via Qualtrics. 
Participants first completed baseline measures of the dependent variables described 
above. Then, they listened to a series of audio clips with accompanying text during which they 
were briefly introduced to the concept of body dissatisfaction and appearance comparisons. We 
discussed the prevalence of body dissatisfaction among young women in contemporary society 
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and touched on the frequency of media messages relaying the ideal appearance. We stated that 
making comparisons with other women was a common occurrence, especially when feeling 
preoccupied or dissatisfied with one’s body. A wide variety of potential targets (e.g., family 
members, friends, acquaintances, strangers) and settings (e.g., on social media, during lectures, 
on public transit, while spending time with friends) for comparison were mentioned, and an 
example of an upward appearance comparison was provided: 
“One particular example might be that you checked Facebook last night and saw your 
high school classmate’s vacation pictures and noticed how much thinner she is now than you 
are.” 
Experimental manipulation. The experimental manipulation was also presented as a 
series of audio clips with accompanying text. The goal of the manipulation was to help 
participants practice in-lab what we would ultimately be asking them to do during their 48-hour 
“contractual period”. Participants were asked to vividly recall a recent distressing appearance 
comparison they had made to another woman in order to simulate the experience of making a 
comparison in the real world: 
“Now please think back to a recent time in which you started to compare yourself to 
another woman in terms of appearance – a real-life comparison that made you really feel 
inadequate and dissatisfied with your appearance or body. Really bring this comparison to mind 
focusing on the various aspects of the other person’s appearance that you thought were superior 
to yours.”  
Following this recall, participants were introduced to and led through their randomly 
assigned caregiving, competition, or control “self-help strategy.” They were told they would be 
asked to employ this particular strategy whenever they made appearance comparisons over the 
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subsequent 48 hours.  Each strategy rehearsal was presented with the same overarching structure: 
an introduction discussing the research-based benefits of each strategy, an interactive portion 
leading participants through the process of applying the strategy to target their recently-recalled 
comparison, and a brief conclusion addressing anticipated reticence specific to each strategy and 
encouraging participants to practice the strategy.  
Caregiving condition. The rationale presented for this self-help strategy normalized the 
competitive mindset that people adopt when focusing on making comparisons, and then 
discussed its downsides, such as feeling disconnected from others and self-focused. The audio 
guide introduced the idea that we also have a compassion-focused mindset at our disposal, which 
is what is active when we care for others. Deliberately shifting to this compassionate mindset 
was presented as a self-help strategy that could lead to greater feelings of happiness and social 
connectedness. The presentation and wording of this self-help strategy was adapted from 
Gilbert’s (2010) previous work in compassion and social mentalities and from loving-kindness 
meditation (Salzberg, 1995). In this condition, participants were asked to shift away from seeing 
their comparison target as a competitor and instead as a fellow human being, and then to 
generate caring thoughts and feelings towards them:  
“In this compassionate mindset, shift away from seeing this person as a competitor, or 
someone who looks better than you, but instead focus on the fact that you are both human 
beings, and try to generate caring thoughts and feelings towards them. Really get in touch with 
the part of yourself that wants other people to be free from suffering and happy, and send these 
well-wishes to this person.”  
Participants were asked to focus on getting into this mindset by recalling a time when 
they had felt compassionate towards another person or animal. They were led to bring these 
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intentions and feelings of compassion to the forefront of their mind and then to redirect them to 
the target of their recalled comparison:  
“Imagine yourself expanding as if you are becoming calmer, wiser, stronger, and more 
mature…really able to care for or help that person. Pay attention to your body as you remember 
your feelings of kindness. Create a compassionate facial expression. Spend a moment with any 
expansion and warmth in your body. Note a real genuine desire for this other person to be free 
of suffering and to flourish. Now bring to mind this person you were recently comparing yourself 
to, while staying in touch with your compassionate feelings and intentions. Keep these alive and 
direct these feelings of compassion toward this person. With this person in mind, and these 
compassionate intentions within you, imagine saying: “May you be well”, “May you be happy”, 
and “May you be free from suffering.” 
 Competition condition. The rationale presented for the competition self-help strategy 
suggested to participants that they could minimize any sense of inadequacy from their recalled 
comparison by thinking of the various ways in which they might be superior to their comparison 
target. The audio guide presented and familiarized participants with the self-help strategy of 
generating qualities, skills, or accomplishments that participants have that their comparison 
target does not have or has to a lesser degree. The presentation of this strategy and the wording 
used were based on previous research in which downward comparisons in non-appearance 
domains were used to intervene with the adverse effects of upward appearance comparisons to 
thin-ideal media (Lew et al., 2007). In this condition, participants were asked to focus on 
domains outside of appearance in which they feel particularly talented or successful: 
“…we want you to identify various other domains outside of appearance (e.g., 
intelligence, work ethic, athletic accomplishments, academic or career accomplishments, quality 
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of life, social relationships, etc.) in which you are better than this person. … Really get in touch 
with the part of yourself that knows you are better than other people in certain ways – the part of 
you that is proud of your talents and successes.”   
In this condition, participants were asked to focus on getting in touch with the 
competitive part of themselves by recalling aspects of themselves, their life, and their 
achievements of which they feel proud, or which they value: 
“To help you get into this mindset, you might try to recall a time when you were more 
successful than others; for example, a time when you got a highly desired co-op job or got a 
higher mark on a test than your friends. Or simply think of things about yourself and your life 
that you value and pride yourself on, for example your ability to form deep friendships.” 
 They were led to bring these intentions and feelings of competition to the forefront of 
their mind and then redirect them to the target of their recalled comparison: 
“Now tell yourself the various ways in which you might be better than this person. For 
example, “I think I’m better than her at forming lasting friendships” or “I have gotten better co-
op jobs than her” or “People think I’m more genuine than her.” Try to think of personally-
relevant comparisons you can make with this person where you believe you are better.” 
 Control condition. The rationale for the control self-help strategy presented the approach 
of using mental strategies to distract oneself from continuing to make comparisons, and their 
benefits. The audio guide presented and familiarized participants with the self-help strategy of 
using mental distractions as “short-term time-outs” to interrupt negative and/or stressful states of 
mind. In this condition, participants were asked to count backwards in threes from 50, 
prioritizing accuracy and even pace: 
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 “In this distraction task, we would like you to focus on counting backwards in threes 
from 50 and then continuing on with your day.…The goal here is to prioritize getting the 
numbers right and keeping an even pace.” 
Contract signing. For their final task of the in-lab session, participants were asked to sign 
a written contract with the researcher in which they would commit to employing their assigned 
self-help strategy for the next 48 hours, whenever they made an upward appearance comparison 
to another woman. This contract protocol has been used successfully in previous experimental 
research (Boone, Soenens, Vansteenkiste, & Braet, 2012). Two copies of the contract were 
signed—one retained by the researcher, and one retained by the participant. An excerpt is 
presented below: 
“This is a contract made between (participant) and (researcher) on (date). I, 
(participant) confirm that in the next 48 hours, as soon as I find myself comparing my body to 
another woman’s body, I will commit to [immediately shifting my mindset to a compassionate 
one / immediately shifting my mindset to a competitive one that focuses on my superior qualities / 
performing my counting distraction task]. I understand what I am required to do and agree to do 
this consistently throughout the next 48 hours. For example, if I encounter a person whom I 
believe to be thinner or more attractive than I am, I will shift from trying to figure out ways in 
which they look better than me, and instead focus on [developing caring, compassionate feelings 
toward them, and wish them happiness and strength in whatever struggles they are going 
through / how I am more intelligent, athletic, or hard-working / counting backwards in threes 
from 50, prioritizing my accuracy and even pace].”  
In order to facilitate study compliance, participants were also given a few minutes after 
signing the contract to generate examples of opportunities in the next 48 hours to employ the 
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strategy and the specifics of how they might do so. A few examples were presented on the 
contract for reference. This written activity was completed on the participant’s copy of the 
contract and was not viewed by the researcher. At the end of each participant’s 48-hour 
contractual period, she received a link to a set of post-intervention questionnaires consisting of 
the dependent variables listed above. We also collected qualitative data on participants’ 
experiences with their strategy during the contract period.  
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Results 
Analytic Strategy 
 All analyses were conducted in SAS 9.4 (SAS Institute, 2012). In order to test the first set 
of hypotheses—that is, to determine whether the Caregiving condition benefitted participants 
over and above the other conditions—a repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with the 
following dependent variables: social safeness, body dissatisfaction, and eating disorder-related 
comparison orientation. These primary analyses included the intervention condition as a 
between-subjects factor with three levels (Caregiving, Competition, Control), and Time as a 
within-subjects factor with two levels (Time 1 or pre-intervention and Time 2 or post-
intervention). All Time 1 variables were standardized in order to facilitate interpretation of 
results. 
 For analyses that yielded a significant Condition x Time effect, 1-df contrasts were used 
to test five planned comparison hypotheses: (1) Caregiving vs. Competition condition; (2) 
Competition vs. Control condition; (3) Caregiving vs. Control condition; (4) Caregiving and 
Competition conditions vs. Control condition; and (5) Caregiving vs. Competition and Control 
conditions. 
 Multiple regression analyses were conducted to test our second set of hypotheses – 
namely, to determine whether baseline (i.e., a 28-day period prior to the study) eating disorder 
symptomatology and/or trait compassion moderated the impact of condition on the dependent 
variables at Time 2. The dependent variables were social safeness, body dissatisfaction, and 
eating disorder-related comparison orientation at Time 2, while the Time 1 levels of these 
variables served as respective covariates. Condition, the moderator variable in question (i.e., 
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eating disorder symptomatology or compassion), and the interaction between the two were 
entered as simultaneous predictors. 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
 Table 1 presents zero-order correlation coefficients for all moderator variables and 
dependent variables at Time 1. Pearson correlations indicated that body dissatisfaction had a 
strong positive correlation with eating disorder-related comparison orientation and eating 
disorder pathology, and a moderate negative correlation with social safeness. Social safeness and 
compassion shared a moderate positive correlation. Compassion also had a moderate negative 
correlation with both body dissatisfaction and eating disorder symptomatology, indicating that 
individuals who were less compassionate had more body dissatisfaction and eating pathology. 
Finally, not surprisingly, eating disorder symptomatology had a moderate positive correlation 
with eating-disorder related comparison orientation, revealing that those with more eating 
pathology made more frequent comparisons to others on the basis of eating, exercise, and body 
appearance. 
 Before testing our primary hypotheses, we examined participants’ expectancies about the 
interventions as well as credibility to ensure there were no differences between the conditions. 
The mean rating for Credibility was 0.56 (SD = 0.17) out of a possible maximum rating of 1, 
indicating that participants found the interventions to be somewhat credible at the outset. The 
mean rating for Expectancy was 0.42 (SD = 0.17) out of a possible maximum rating of 1, 
indicating that participants had slightly below average expectations about the efficacy of the 
interventions. There were no significant differences—F (2, 60) = 0.36, p = .70, and F (2, 60) = 
0.41, p = .67, respectively—between the three conditions on Credibility or Expectancy, 
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suggesting that across conditions, participants found their assigned self-help strategy to be 
equally credible and had equivalent levels of expectations about them. 
We also examined participants’ self-reported compliance with the interventions to ensure 
there were no differences between the conditions. The first compliance item asked participants 
about the proportion of comparisons in which they implemented their learned self-help strategy 
as instructed, while the second asked about how much effort they put into implementing the 
strategy when doing so. The mean compliance rating for Item 1 was 74.63 (SD = 27.05) out of a 
possible maximum rating of 100, indicating that the overall level of compliance was high. The 
mean effort rating (Item 2) was 3.70 (SD = 0.68) out of a possible maximum rating of 4, 
indicating that the overall level of participant effort was high. There were no significant 
differences—F (2, 53) = 0.74, p = .48 and F (2, 54) = 0.38, p = .69, respectively—between the 
three conditions on either compliance item, suggesting that between conditions, participants were 
equally compliant and effortful in employing their learned self-help strategy. 
 
Central Analyses 
 Social safeness. There was a significant effect of Time on social safeness, F (1, 53) = 
10.28, p = .003 with participants across conditions experiencing an increase in social safeness 
over the 48-hour contract period. Condition and Time interacted to predict social safeness at a 
trend-level, F (2, 53) = 2.90, p = .06, suggesting that condition impacted the change in feelings 
of social safeness participants experienced over the 48-hour contract period. Planned 
comparisons showed three significant contrasts supporting hypotheses: the Caregiving condition 
increased feelings of social safeness more than the Competition condition, F (1, 53) = 4.52, p = 
.04, the Control condition, F (1, 53) = 4.26, p = .04, and the average of both the Competition and 
Control conditions, F (1, 53) = 5.80, p = .02. No other contrasts were significant. 
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 Regression analyses revealed that trait compassion interacted with condition to predict 
social safeness at Time 2, F (2, 48) = 3.90, p = .03. In order to determine the nature of this 
interaction, Time 2 social safeness scores, controlling for Time 1 scores, were estimated and 
graphed within each condition for participants with lower (1 SD below the mean) and higher (1 
SD above the mean) levels of trait compassion (see Figure 1). Contrasts revealed that individuals 
with lower trait compassion in the Caregiving condition had significantly higher social safeness 
scores after the 48-hour contract period compared to their counterparts in the Competition, t (48) 
= 2.06, p = .05, and Control, t (48) = 2.6 , p = .01, conditions. In contrast, individuals with 
higher trait compassion in the Caregiving condition had significantly lower social safeness scores 
after the 48-hour contract period compared to their counterparts in the Competition, t (48) = -
2.06, p = .05, and Control, t (48) = -2.63, p = .01, conditions. 
 Baseline eating disorder symptomatology did not significantly interact with condition to 
predict social safeness at Time 2, F (2, 48) = 1.49, p = .23. 
Body dissatisfaction. There was a significant effect of Time on body dissatisfaction, F 
(1, 53) = 15.19, p < .001, whereby across conditions, participants experienced a decrease in 
body dissatisfaction over the 48-hour contract period. No significant interaction between 
Condition and Time was found, F (2, 53) = 0.34, p = .71, indicating that the condition 
participants were assigned to did not influence the change in body dissatisfaction they 
experienced over the 48-hour contract period. 
 In regression analyses, trait compassion did not significantly interact with condition to 
predict body dissatisfaction at Time 2, F (2, 48) = 2.05, p = .14. 
Baseline eating disorder symptomatology interacted with condition to predict body 
dissatisfaction at Time 2, F (2, 48) = 3.42, p = .04. Figure 2 depicts Time 2 body dissatisfaction 
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estimates within each condition for participants with lower and higher levels of baseline eating 
disorder symptomatology. Contrasts indicated that individuals with higher eating pathology in 
the Caregiving condition had lower body dissatisfaction scores after the 48-hour contract period 
compared to those with higher eating pathology in the Competition condition, t (48) = -2.57 , p 
= .01, and the Control condition, t (48) = -1.71 , p = .09 (see Figure 2). In contrast, individuals 
with lower eating pathology in the Caregiving condition had significantly higher body 
dissatisfaction scores compared to those in the Competition condition, t (48) = 2.57, p = .01; the 
same result was found at trend-level between the Caregiving and Control conditions, t (48) = 
1.71, p = .09.  
Eating disorder-related comparison orientation. There was a significant effect of 
Time on eating disorder-related comparison orientation, F (1, 53) = 26.74, p < .001, with 
participants across conditions experiencing a decrease in body dissatisfaction over the 48-hour 
contract period. No significant interaction between Condition and Time was found, F (2, 53) = 
0.98, p = .38, suggesting that condition did not impact change in eating disorder-related 
comparison orientation over the 48-hour contract period. 
In regression analyses, trait compassion did not interact with condition to predict eating 
disorder-related comparison orientation at Time 2, F (2, 48) = 2.35, p = .11. However, because 
this effect approached a statistical trend, we thought it would be interesting to probe the 
interaction. Figure 3 depicts Time 2 estimates of scores on eating disorder-related comparison 
orientation within each condition for participants with lower (1 SD below the mean) and higher 
(1 SD above the mean) levels of trait compassion. Contrasts indicated that individuals with lower 
trait compassion in the Caregiving condition were significantly less oriented towards making 
eating disorder-related comparisons after the 48-hour contract period compared to their 
45 
 
counterparts in the Competition condition, t (48) = -2.16, p = .04. However, individuals with 
higher trait compassion in the Caregiving condition were significantly more oriented towards 
making eating disorder-related comparisons after the 48-hour contract period compared to their 
counterparts in the Competition condition, t (48) = 2.16, p = .04. 
A trend emerged whereby eating disorder symptomatology interacted with condition to 
predict eating disorder-related comparison orientation at Time 2, F (2, 48) = 2.62, p = .08. 
Figure 4 portrays estimated Time 2 levels of eating disorder-related comparison orientation for 
participants with lower and higher levels of baseline eating disorder symptomatology. Contrasts 
indicated that individuals with higher baseline eating disorder symptomatology in the Caregiving 
condition were significantly less oriented towards making eating disorder-related comparisons 
after the 48-hour contract period compared to those with higher eating pathology in the 
Competition condition, t (48) = -2.28 , p = .03. In contrast, individuals with lower trait eating 
disorder symptomatology in the Competition condition were significantly less oriented towards 
making eating disorder-related comparisons after the 48-hour contract period compared to those 
with lower eating pathology in the Caregiving condition, t (48) = 2.28 , p = .03. 
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Discussion 
Using a novel intervention, the present study investigated the effectiveness of adopting a 
caregiving mindset in alleviating the negative consequences of appearance-focused social 
comparisons. Specifically, we sought to compare the impact of three different strategies that 
college women were to use after making unfavourable appearance comparisons during a 48-hour 
period: switching to a caregiving mindset focused on engendering compassion and well-wishes 
towards the target, remaining in a competitive mindset and making downward comparisons to 
the same target in different domains, and as a control condition, adopting a distraction-based 
tactic. Results supported (at trend-level) the hypothesis that relative to the other conditions, 
women in the Caregiving condition would report higher levels of social safeness after the 48-
hour intervention period. In addition, baseline eating disorder symptomatology and trait 
compassion interacted with condition to predict post-intervention outcomes, including body 
dissatisfaction and eating disorder-related comparison orientation, with results generally 
suggesting that the Caregiving intervention was more beneficial for those higher in eating 
pathology and/or lower in trait compassion, whereas the Competitive intervention was more 
effective for those lower in eating pathology and/or higher in trait compassion. 
 
Moderators of Intervention Effects 
One of the most interesting set of findings to emerge from the present study was that the 
relative efficacy of our Caregiving versus Competition intervention depended on features of the 
participant – namely, their baseline eating pathology and their trait compassion. For women with 
higher baseline levels of eating disorder symptomatology, the Caregiving intervention had the 
greatest impact on body dissatisfaction and eating disorder-related comparison orientation over 
the 48-hour intervention period. However, for those with lower levels of eating disorder 
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symptomatology, the Competition intervention had the greatest impact. We also found that for 
women with lower trait levels of compassion, the Caregiving intervention had a greater impact 
on feelings of social safeness and eating disorder-related comparison orientation, but for 
individuals higher in trait compassion, the Competition condition did. Therefore, young women 
who were less compassionate or had more eating disorder pathology to begin with benefited 
more from responding to appearance comparisons by cultivating compassion and loving-
kindness toward their comparison targets than they did from generating downward comparisons 
toward their targets on non-appearance domains; however, the reverse was true for individuals 
who were more compassionate or had less eating pathology. 
It is interesting to speculate about the reasons why participants’ eating pathology and trait 
compassion moderated the effects of our interventions. One way to interpret the results would be 
to see levels of compassion and eating pathology as indirect indicators of women’s competitive 
orientation. Indeed, zero-order correlations revealed that women with more eating pathology 
endorsed a greater comparison-orientation, which suggests a more competitive mindset. 
Furthermore, compassion is often seen as the opposite of competitiveness (Gilbert et al., 2009b), 
suggesting that lower compassion may represent a tendency toward competitiveness and higher 
compassion a tendency against it. When examined from this perspective, our results suggest that 
adopting a caregiving approach vis-à-vis social comparison targets was more beneficial than 
making downward comparisons to targets for individuals who were more competitively oriented 
to begin with, whereas the reverse was true for college women who were lower in 
competitiveness. For more competitively oriented women, it is possible that any strategy 
involving comparisons (whether upward or downward) may have perpetuated a competitive 
orientation. Shifting this orientation altogether to one of caregiving may have changed these 
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women’s view of other females from ‘threats’ and ‘rivals’ to fellow human beings with their own 
suffering, thereby reducing the need to make appearance comparisons and the associated feelings 
of body dissatisfaction. It is also the case that for women with higher eating pathology in 
particular, attending to non-appearance domains of superiority simply may not have been enough 
to alleviate their body image concerns, given their higher level of preoccupation; here especially, 
a shift in overall perspectives may have been necessary. 
Wood’s (1989) theory that social comparisons can be carried out in the pursuit of 
different goals, such as self-evaluation, self-improvement, and self-enhancement, may also help 
to explain some of our findings. For women with lower eating pathology and/or higher 
compassion, appearance comparisons may be made more often in the pursuit of self-
enhancement, that is, a motivation to maintain or enhance their self-esteem. Consequently, the 
downward comparisons made in the Competition intervention may serve as a better way to 
accomplish this goal, as opposed to the compassion and well-wishes generated in the Caregiving 
intervention, which is unlikely to affect self-esteem. While such an explanation may be at odds 
with extant research suggesting that individuals low in self-esteem, who generally have more 
eating pathology, are more likely to make comparisons to self-enhance, future research should 
nevertheless explore this idea, as it could apply uniquely to the physical appearance domain, 
which already appears to be an exceptional domain when it comes to social comparison theory. 
 
Intervention Effects on Changes in Social Safeness  
 Although together, our results suggest that cultivating a caregiving mindset was effective 
at reducing body dissatisfaction and an eating disorder-related comparison orientation for certain 
types of individuals only, we found that it was most effective across all participants at 
increasing feelings of social safeness. Given that the caregiving mindset is oriented towards 
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fostering compassion and a desire to connect with others, it makes sense that adopting it in the 
face of an appearance comparison would, more so than a downward-comparison strategy, help 
individuals cease to perceive others as competitors, and instead start to feel emotionally 
connected to them, which is a component of social safeness. Our finding is consistent with 
earlier work demonstrating the effectiveness of compassion-based interventions in fostering 
social connection (e.g., Hutcherson et al., 2008). Another implication of our results is that in the 
appearance domain, using downward comparisons to protect against the negative consequences 
of upward comparisons may not be the most effective of strategies if one’s goal is to improve an 
individual’s feelings of security and safeness in their social environment. 
 
Theoretical and Practical Implications 
 This study was the first to our knowledge to apply social mentalities theory to inform the 
study of interventions for harmful appearance comparisons. Our results suggest that the theory is 
a useful lens through which to understand and intervene with social comparisons in the 
appearance domain. This study was also the first to show the benefits of cultivating compassion 
for others on body image and eating disorder-related behaviour. Such results are a novel addition 
to a growing body of work demonstrating the benefits of compassion for others on one’s 
psychological (e.g., Cosley et al., 2010; Seppala et al., 2014) and physical well-being (e.g., 
Brown et al., 2003; Konrath et al., 2012), whether through providing compassion-motivated 
support or through cultivating compassion for others as a part of loving-kindness meditation 
(Hutcherson et al., 2008). Furthermore, although this study only specifically targeted appearance 
comparisons, the measure we used to assess appearance comparisons assessed comparisons 
based on body, eating, and exercise. It is therefore quite remarkable that for a subset of our 
participants (those lower in compassion and higher in eating pathology), the Caregiving 
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intervention emerged as beneficial for this range of comparisons implicated in eating pathology. 
The encouraging results of the present study suggest that there may be promise in encouraging 
the cultivation of compassion for others as a way to target other problems in the body image and 
eating domain, such as fat talk, or exercise dependence. 
From a practical standpoint, this study suggests that the way we should teach young 
women to cope better with their appearance comparisons will depend on their current level of 
eating pathology and/or compassion. For individuals who are less vulnerable – that is, those who 
have less eating pathology and more compassion – there may be greater merit to thinking about 
their comparisons from the perspective of social comparison theory, and thus to encouraging 
them to make more downward comparisons. However, for those with higher eating pathology 
and/or lower compassion, a different perspective and approach may be more advisable. 
Specifically, by making a habit of generating feelings of compassion and well-wishes towards 
those they compare themselves with unfavourably, these individuals are not only likely to 
experience less body dissatisfaction and less of a need to make eating disorder-related 
comparisons to begin with, but are also likely to feel safer and more connected to others in their 
social environment.  Given that these individuals generally struggle socially (Hinrichsen, Wright, 
Waller, & Meyer, 2003; Striegel-Moore, Silberstein, & Rodin, 1993; Tiller et al., 1997), which 
may in turn perpetuate their body dissatisfaction, such a contribution would be non-trivial. 
 
Limitations and Future Directions 
 This study had some limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, the 
participant sample was relatively small and homogeneous, composed of young females recruited 
from a university setting. While we restricted the study to female participants based on research 
pointing to a greater frequency of upward appearance-focused comparisons among women and a 
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stronger link to body image dysfunction as a result (Strahan et al., 2006; Thomas & Heinberg, 
1993), both men and women do make appearance-focused comparisons. It will be important to 
extend the generalizability of the present study’s results by investigating the effectiveness of 
adopting a caregiving mindset when faced with appearance-focused social comparisons among 
males, younger and older populations, individuals recruited from community-based settings, and 
also clinical settings. It would also be interesting to see how results may diverge for these 
different groups or how they might change with a larger sample size. 
 Second, this study relied exclusively on self-report measures to assess variables; 
consequently, some participants could have been motivated by self-presentation concerns when 
completing questionnaires. The high mean for the compassion measure in our sample may be 
one such indicator of such influences, as participants may have wanted to present themselves as 
compassionate in their responses. Future research would benefit from the incorporation of 
behavioural measures (e.g., restrained eating task) into the study design. 
 Third, for feasibility reasons, this study was conducted over a relatively brief period of 48 
hours. This time period may not have afforded participants enough time to habituate to their 
assigned intervention, and thus, fully benefit or show marked changes from its effects. This 
could be especially true of the Caregiving intervention, which was likely a novel strategy for 
most participants to which it was assigned. Future research should extend the intervention time 
period to allow for this habituation, but also to investigate the sustainability of the various 
strategies taught to participants over time. For example, while the Competition intervention was 
shown to be beneficial to some women in this study, perhaps its effectiveness as a strategy 
degrades over time—this could potentially explain why the research on the utility of downward 
comparisons is mixed. It would also be of interest to examine how the various interventions may 
52 
 
change in effectiveness over time, and to see whether these changes are moderated by 
demographics and/or other baseline variables. For instance, do women benefit more from the 
Caregiving intervention more so than men? 
 Fourth, while this study was limited to the domain of appearance-focused comparisons, 
future research could apply this social mentalities-based intervention to other domains of social 
comparison, such as wealth or intelligence, to test its generalizability. 
 Finally, the results of the present study brings forth the natural question of what drives 
these effects; for example, how exactly does the caregiving mentality bring about increased 
feelings of social safeness? Although speculative, one potential explanation could be drawn from 
Fredrickson (2004)’s broaden-and-build theory of positive emotions, which proposes that 
positive emotions (e.g., joy, contentment, love) broaden one’s attention and momentary thought-
action repertoire (i.e., the range of cognitive and behavioural tendencies available as responses to 
an event), and in doing so build one’s psychological resilience and personal resources for 
survival. Extant literature has explored this theory as the mechanism behind loving-kindness 
meditation (Fredrickson et al., 2008). Similarly, broaden-and-build theory could be driving the 
Caregiving intervention, given the intervention’s inclusion of components of loving-kindness; its 
generation of positive emotions that are intrinsic to the caregiving mindset, such as warmth and 
love; and its directed broadening of participants’ attention from only themselves and their bodies 
to their comparison targets. Future research should test this proposed mechanism, as well as 
other plausible mechanisms, behind the observed effects. 
 
Conclusions 
The present study was the first to investigate the benefits of adopting a caregiving 
mindset in the face of appearance-focused social comparisons. Findings suggest that cultivating a 
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caregiving mindset toward the target of unfavourable appearance comparisons can increase 
feelings of social safeness, and for some women, alleviate body dissatisfaction and/or reduce the 
tendency to make body, eating, and exercise-related comparisons. Results also suggest that 
cultivating a caregiving mindset may be especially helpful to women with lower trait compassion 
and/or higher baseline eating pathology, who are perhaps most vulnerable to the threat of 
appearance-focused social comparisons. 
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Table 1 
 
Correlations between Moderator and Dependent Variables at Baseline 
 
Variables 
 
SS 
 
BD 
 
EDCO 
 
C 
 
EDS 
 
Social safeness (SS) 
--     
 
Body dissatisfaction (BD) 
-.36** --    
 
Eating disorder-related 
comparison orientation 
(EDCO) 
-.14 .65*** --   
 
Compassion (C) 
.41*** -.29* -.01 --  
 
Eating disorder 
symptomatology (EDS) 
-.22 .74*** .46*** -.27* -- 
Notes: *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 Moderator variables (C, EDS) assessed pre-lab. 
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Figure 1. Trait compassion moderates the effect of condition on social safeness. Controlling for pre-
intervention social safeness, in the Caregiving condition, those with lower trait compassion reported 
higher social safeness relative to their counterparts in the Competition condition, while those with higher 
trait compassion reported lower social safeness relative to their counterparts in the Competition condition. 
Lower/higher compassion represents -1/+1 standard deviation from the mean. 
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Figure 2. Baseline eating disorder symptomatology (EDS) moderates the effect of condition on body 
dissatisfaction. Controlling for pre-intervention body dissatisfaction, in the Caregiving condition, those 
with higher baseline EDS reported lower body dissatisfaction relative to their counterparts in the 
Competition condition, while those with lower baseline EDS reported higher body dissatisfaction 
compared to their counterparts in the Competition condition. Lower/higher EDS represents -1/+1 standard 
deviation from the mean. 
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Figure 3. Trait compassion moderates the effect of condition on eating disorder-related comparison 
orientation. Controlling for pre-intervention eating disorder-related comparison orientation, in the 
Caregiving condition, those with lower trait compassion reported being less oriented to make eating 
disorder related-comparisons relative to their counterparts in the Competition condition, while those with 
higher trait compassion reported being more oriented to make eating disorder-related comparisons relative 
to their counterparts in the Competition condition. Lower/higher compassion represents -1/+1 standard 
deviation from the mean. 
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Figure 4. Baseline eating disorder symptomatology (EDS) moderates the effect of condition on eating 
disorder-related comparison orientation. Controlling for pre-intervention eating disorder-related 
comparison orientation, in the Caregiving condition, those with higher baseline EDS reported being less 
oriented to make eating disorder-related comparisons relative to their counterparts in the Competition 
condition, while those with lower baseline EDS reported being more oriented to make eating disorder-
related comparisons relative to their counterparts in the Competition condition. Lower/higher EDS 
represents -1/+1 standard deviation from the mean. 
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